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Wednesday, March 18, 2026

WILL ₹1,132 crore GST demand FROM JHARKHAND GST AUTHORITIES IMPACT THE TATA GROUP FUTURE FINANCIALS?

 WILL ₹1,132 crore GST demand FROM JHARKHAND GST AUTHORITIES IMPACT THE TATA GROUP FUTURE FINANCIALS?

TATA STEEL FILED AN APPEAL AGAINST A ₹1,132 CRORE GST DEMAND FROM JHARKHAND GST AUTHORITIES IN JHARKHAND HIGH COURT

KEY FACTS OF THE CASE

Tata Steel has filed a writ petition in the Jharkhand High Court challenging a ₹1,132 crore GST demand order, which includes ₹493 crore in tax and ₹638 crore in penalties. The dispute centers on alleged irregularities in Input Tax Credit (ITC) claims between FY 2018-19 and FY 2022-23.

NATURE OF DISPUTE

The demand arises from alleged irregular availment of Input Tax Credit (ITC) under GST.

The tax department claims improper timing /eligibility of ITC claims.

TATA STEEL ARGUES THAT:

ITC was claimed in compliance with law, though sometimes in different financial years.

Its submissions were not properly considered during adjudication.

LEGAL ACTION TAKEN BY TATA STEEL

The company filed a writ petition before the Jharkhand High Court on March 11, 2026 seeking to quash the order.

IMPLICATIONS FOR TATA STEEL

FINANCIAL IMPACT:

 If upheld, the order could significantly affect Tata Steel’s cash flows and profitability.

LEGAL STRATEGY:

 By filing a writ petition, Tata Steel is seeking to quash the adjudication order entirely rather than negotiate or settle.

MARKET REACTION:

Analysts are closely watching the case, as such large tax disputes can influence investor sentiment and stock performance.

₹1,132 CRORE GST DEMAND ORDER AGAINST TATA STEELS HOW THIS IMPACT ON THE FINANCIALS OF TATA GROUP

IMMEDIATE IMPACT ON TATA STEEL FINANCIALS

(A) P&L impact (short-term)

·      No immediate hit to profit unless:

·      company accepts liability, or

·      creates a provision (Ind AS 37)

Currently:

·      Company has indicated no immediate financial/operational impact

·      Likely treated as contingent liability disclosure, not expense.

MATERIALITY ANALYSIS (KEY INSIGHT)

To understand real impact:

TATA STEEL ANNUAL REVENUES:

₹2–2.5 lakh crore range

 

EBITDA

₹30,000–₹40,000 crore range (cyclical)

 

 

·      ₹1,132 CRORE IS ROUGHLY:

·      0.5% of revenue

·      3–4% of EBITDA

 

CONCLUSION:

 

Financially not material enough to impair operations or solvency

 

PRACTICAL TAKEAWAY

This case highlights a recurring GST litigation theme:

Timing of ITC claims remains a high-risk area for large corporates.

Even procedural deviations (timing mismatches) can trigger:

·      Section 74 proceedings

·      Heavy penalties (often exceeding tax demand)

YOUR COMPLIANCE PARTNER – R V SECKAR , FCS, LLB 79047 19295

Monday, March 16, 2026

WHY LISTED COMPANIES MUST HOLD AT LEAST ONE MEETING OF INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS ANNUALLY, WITHOUT THE PRESENCE OF NON-INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS OR MANAGEMENT?

 WHY LISTED COMPANIES MUST HOLD AT LEAST ONE MEETING OF INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS ANNUALLY, WITHOUT THE PRESENCE OF NON-INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS OR MANAGEMENT?

ARE YOU A COMPLIANCE OFFICER? HAVE YOU PLANNED TO CONDUCT A SEPARATE INDEPENDENT DIRECTOR MEETING ON OR BEFORE 31st MARCH 2026?

MANDATORY INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS’ MEETINGS

Several listed companies in India conducted their mandatory Independent Directors’ meetings in March 2026, including GKB Ophthalmics Ltd (March 18), Jayatma Industries Ltd (March 20), and B. P. Capital Ltd (March 24).

These meetings were held in compliance with SEBI’s Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirements (LODR) and the Companies Act, 2013.

This meeting is to be organized pursuant to Regulation 25(3) of the SEBI (LODR) Regulations, 2015, read with Schedule IV of the Companies Act, 2013, specifically in the last quarter of Financial Year.

PURPOSE

Such meeting will focus on reviewing the performance of non-independent directors, the board, and the assessed the quality and timeliness of information flow between management and the board to ensure effective governance.

KEY AGENDA ITEMS

REVIEW AREA:

DETAILS

Board Performance:

Performance of non-independent directors and board as a whole

Chairperson Assessment:

Performance review considering views of executive and non-executive directors

Information Flow:

Quality, quantity and timeliness of management-board communication

 

INFORMATION FLOW EVALUATION

A significant focus of the meeting is to assess the information flow between the company's management and the board of directors. The independent directors will have to evaluate whether the quality, quantity, and timeliness of information provided enables the board to effectively and reasonably perform their duties.

REGULATORY COMMUNICATION

The outcome of this meeting is to be formally communicated to BSE Listed's Department of Corporate Services, with the notification signed by a Director. This communication ensures compliance with disclosure requirements under Regulation 30 of the SEBI (LODR) Regulations, 2015.

COMPANIES CONDUCTING INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS’ MEETINGS (MARCH 2026)

COMPANY

KEY AGENDA / PURPOSE

GKB Ophthalmics Ltd

Separate meeting of Independent Directors under SEBI LODR & Companies Act provisions.

Jayatma Industries Ltd

Review performance of Non-Independent Directors, Board as a whole, and Chairperson.

B. P. Capital Ltd

Assess performance of Non-Independent Directors, Board, and quality of information flow.

Shukra Pharmaceuticals Ltd.

Separate meeting of Independent Directors under SEBI LODR & Companies Act provisions.

 

RISKS & COMPLIANCE CONSIDERATIONS

NON-COMPLIANCE:

Failure to conduct these meetings can attract penalties from SEBI and damage investor confidence.

TRANSPARENCY:

 Companies must disclose notices and outcomes of these meetings to stock exchanges (BSE/NSE).

INVESTOR IMPACT:

These meetings reassure shareholders that independent oversight is functioning, especially in governance-sensitive sectors.

KEY TAKEAWAYS FOR INVESTORS

    Investors should monitor exchange filings for outcomes of these meetings, as they often include performance reviews and governance assessments.

    Such compliance signals strong corporate governance practices, which can be a positive indicator for long-term investment stability.

 

YOUR COMPLIANCE PARTNER – R V SECKAR , FCS, LLB 79047 19295

PENALTY IMPOSED ON ROSMERTA HOLDINGS FOR IMPROPER NUMBERING OF MINUTE SHEETS IN THE MINUTES BOOK UNDER THE COMPANIES ACT, 2013

 PENALTY IMPOSED ON ROSMERTA HOLDINGS FOR IMPROPER NUMBERING OF MINUTE SHEETS IN THE MINUTES BOOK UNDER THE COMPANIES ACT, 2013

ROSMERTA HOLDINGS / ROSMERTA AUTOTECH LIMITED VS. REGISTRAR OF COMPANIES (ROC), NEW DELHI

FACTS OF THE CASE

·      The Registrar of Companies, Delhi conducted an inspection under Section 206(5).

·      It was observed that the company had not consecutively numbered the minutes books of board meetings.

·      Instead, the numbering was restarted from Page 1 each financial year, which violates Secretarial Standards.

·      The violation occurred for FY 2014-15 onwards in certain minutes’ records.

LEGAL FRAMEWORK

·      Section 118 of the Companies Act, 2013

·      Secretarial Standard-1 (SS-1) issued by the Institute of Company Secretaries of India (ICSI)

KEY COMPLIANCE REQUIREMENT

Minutes must be continuously numbered.

Example:

If FY 2024-25 ends at Page 10,

FY 2025-26 must begin at Page 11, not Page 1 again.

PENALTY IMPOSED

·      Company: ₹25,000

·      Directors in default: ₹5,000 each(On 2 directors)

KEY COMPLIANCE TAKEAWAY

Companies must ensure that minutes books are properly bound and pages are consecutively numbered without restarting each financial year. Even seemingly minor procedural lapses in maintaining statutory registers can attract penalties under the Companies Act, 2013.

YOUR COMPLIANCE PARTNER – R V SECKAR , FCS, LLB 79047 19295

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Saturday, March 14, 2026

CAN A COMPANY SECRETARY CUM COMPLIANCE OFFICER OF A LISTED COMPANY CAN BE HELD ACCOUNTABLE FOR ACCOUNTING IRREGULARITIES WHILE SIGNING FINANCIAL STATEMENTS IN ADDITION TO CFO AND DIRECTORS?

 CAN A COMPANY SECRETARY CUM COMPLIANCE OFFICER OF A LISTED COMPANY CAN BE HELD ACCOUNTABLE FOR ACCOUNTING IRREGULARITIES WHILE SIGNING FINANCIAL STATEMENTS IN ADDITION TO  CFO AND DIRECTORS?

NOT ACCOUNTABLE

A Company Secretary cum Compliance Officer of a listed company is generally not held accountable for accounting irregularities in the same way as the CFO and directors, unless there is clear evidence of their active involvement or a specific statutory duty to verify financial data.

It has long been settled position that Company Secretaries are not responsible for ensuring that financial statements comply with accounting standards.

Under Sec 134(5)(a), 128 and 129(7) of the Companies Act 2013, the responsibility for preparing financial statements and ensuring compliance with applicable accounting standards primarily rests with the Directors and the CFO, not with the CS.

RECENT SAT RULING

Recent rulings by the Securities Appellate Tribunal (SAT) in India have clarified that mere signing of financial statements does not automatically impose liability.

PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY RESTS UPON WHOM?

•     CFO and Directors bear direct responsibility for the accuracy of financial statements under the Companies Act, 2013 and SEBI regulations.

•     They are accountable for ensuring compliance with accounting standards and disclosure norms.

ROLE OF COMPANY SECRETARY/COMPLIANCE OFFICER:

•     Their role is primarily ministerial and procedural, focusing on ensuring compliance with corporate governance, regulatory filings, and board processes.

•     They are not expected to audit or verify financial data unless explicitly mandated.

SAT RULINGS (2025)  IN V. SHANKAR V SEBI

SAT held that compliance officers cannot be penalized for accounting irregularities unless they had a direct role in misrepresentation or fraud.

       IN THE DECCAN CHRONICLE HOLDINGS LTD. CASE

SAT quashed penalties against the Company Secretary, ruling that signing financial statements does not imply liability without proven involvement.

OFFICER IN DEFAULT:

Merely being a Company Secretary (and a Key Managerial Personnel) does not automatically make them an "officer in default" under Section 77A of the Companies Act (regarding buybacks) unless it is established they were part of the wrongdoing.

SEBI IN THE MATTER OF COFFEE DAY ENTERPRISES HELD COMPLIANCE OFFICER IS ACCOUNTABLE

SEBI examined the role of the CS by referring to Regulation 6(2) of the SEBI LODR Regulations, SEBI reasoned that the Compliance Officer is responsible for ensuring conformity with regulatory requirements and reporting non compliances to the Board.

Since the Compliance Officer was a signatory to the financial statements, SEBI observed that the Compliance Officer failed to ensure compliance with regulatory provisions applicable to the preparation of the financial statements and failed to bring such requirements to the notice of the Board.

REGULATION 6(2) OF THE SEBI LODR REGULATIONS

Referring to Regulation 6(2) of the SEBI LODR Regulations, SEBI reasoned that the Compliance Officer is responsible for ensuring conformity with regulatory requirements and reporting non compliances to the Board.

Since the Compliance Officer was a signatory to the financial statements, SEBI observed that the Compliance Officer failed to ensure compliance with regulatory provisions applicable to the preparation of the financial statements and failed to bring such requirements to the notice of the Board.

RESPONSIBILITIES OF COMPANY SECRETARIES UNDER CORPORATE AND SECURITIES LAWS

Having held the above, as professionals one needs to be tremendously cautious, while signing the financials or any other document containing the financial aspects even though approved by the Board or any other competent authority, as there is no blanket protection available to a company secretary, even though such checks have been carried out by an independent statutory auditor.

HOW SEBI IN THE MATTER OF COFFEE DAY ENTERPRISES HELD COMPLIANCE OFFICER IS ACCOUNTABLE IS IN VARIANCE WITH SAT RULINGS (2025)  IN V. SHANKAR V SEBI AND SAT DECISION IN THE DECCAN CHRONICLE HOLDINGS LTD CASE

SEBI’s order in the Coffee Day Enterprises case (2026) held the compliance officer directly accountable for disclosure lapses, but this approach diverges from SAT’s 2025 rulings in V. Shankar v. SEBI and the Deccan Chronicle Holdings Ltd. case, where SAT limited liability of compliance officers unless specific involvement or statutory duty was proven.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE VARIANCE

REGULATORY UNCERTAINTY:

SEBI’s stance increases compliance risk for officers, while SAT rulings provide relief by narrowing liability.

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IMPACT:

Companies may face difficulty attracting qualified compliance officers if SEBI continues imposing penalties without proof of involvement.

POTENTIAL APPEALS:

Coffee Day officers may challenge SEBI’s order before SAT, citing consistency with V. Shankar and DCHL precedents.

POLICY DEBATE:

Raises the question of whether compliance officers should act as watchdogs with substantive liability or remain ministerial facilitators.

KEY TAKEAWAY

The variance lies in SEBI’s expansive interpretation of compliance officer accountability versus SAT’s restrictive, evidence-based approach. Unless SEBI’s order is upheld on appeal, SAT precedents suggest compliance officers cannot be penalized merely for being signatories or procedural overseers without proof of complicity.


YOUR COMPLIANCE PARTNER – R V SECKAR , FCS, LLB 79047 19295

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Thursday, March 12, 2026

TRANSMISSION OF SHARES TO LEGAL HEIRS-- DEATH SHOULD NOT FREEZE SECURITY HOLDER’S WEALTH- SEBI EASES RULES FOR FASTER TRANSMISSION OF SECURITIES

 TRANSMISSION OF SHARES TO LEGAL HEIRS-- DEATH SHOULD NOT FREEZE SECURITY HOLDER’S WEALTH- SEBI EASES RULES FOR FASTER TRANSMISSION OF SECURITIES

PROPOSED MAJOR REFORMS

SEBI has proposed major reforms to simplify the transmission of securities after an investor’s death. The idea behind the reform is clear: an investor’s death should not cause their wealth to remain stuck in procedural hurdles.

SEBI’S KEY REFORM PROPOSALS (2026)

SEBI has proposed a framework to speed up and simplify the transmission process.

(a) Higher Thresholds for Simplified Documentation

For small-value holdings, heirs will be able to claim securities with minimal documentation.

Example thresholds proposed:

-        Up to ₹10,000 per listed entity / mutual fund (for physical or statement-of-account holdings).

-        Up to ₹30,000 per beneficial owner for demat securities.

This allows quick settlement of small claims.

THE NECESSITY OF SEBI’S REFORM

The Problem: Wealth Often Gets “Frozen” in the existing system.

When an investor holding shares, mutual funds, or demat securities dies, their family or legal heirs often face:

-        Complex paperwork

-        Multiple verification procedures

-        Long processing timelines

-        Confusion about nominee vs legal heir rights

This often results in assets remaining unclaimed or locked for years.

STRAIGHT-THROUGH PROCESSING (STP)

SEBI plans to introduce automatic processing for small claims without extensive manual verification.

BENEFITS:

-        Faster transmission

-        Reduced paperwork

-        Less dependency on legal documentation.

SEBI’S IMPLEMENTATION TIMELINE:

Proposals are open for public comments until April 2, 2026, meaning final rules may evolve.

KEY TAKEAWAY

SEBI’s initiative is a progressive step toward ensuring that death does not freeze wealth. By modernizing transmission rules, heirs will face fewer hurdles, and India’s financial markets will become more investor-friendly.

YOUR COMPLIANCE PARTNER – R V SECKAR , FCS, LLB 79047 19295

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Tuesday, March 10, 2026

WHETHER THE OFFICE OF DIRECTOR AUTOMATICALLY BECOMES VACANT UNDER SECTION 167(1)(B) OF THE COMPANIES ACT, 2013 IF A DIRECTOR DID NOT ATTEND BOARD MEETINGS FOR 12 MONTHS?

WHETHER THE  OFFICE OF DIRECTOR AUTOMATICALLY BECOMES VACANT UNDER  SECTION 167(1)(B) OF THE COMPANIES ACT, 2013 IF A DIRECTOR DID NOT ATTEND BOARD MEETINGS FOR 12 MONTHS? 



SECTION 167(1)(B) OF THE COMPANIES ACT, 2013  EFFECT

 The office of a director shall become vacant if “he absents himself from all the meetings of the Board of Directors held during a period of twelve months with or without seeking leave of absence of the Board.

AUTOMATIC EFFECT:

The vacancy occurs by operation of law, meaning no separate resolution or action by the company is required.

 

SCOPE:

Applies to all directors (executive, non-executive, independent) unless specifically exempted by another provision.

PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS FOR COMPANIES

Monitoring attendance:

Companies must maintain accurate records of board meeting attendance to identify when a director has crossed the 12-month threshold.

Filing requirements:

Once the office becomes vacant, the company must file Form DIR-12 with the Registrar of Companies to notify the change.

Board composition:

If the vacancy reduces the number of directors below the statutory minimum (e.g., 2 for private companies, 3 for public companies), the company must promptly appoint new directors.

 

BUT ROC MAY NOT APPROVE THE FORM DIR-12 AND ASK YOU TO RESUBMIT WITH THE FOLLOWING DOCUMENTS

·      Minutes of all Board Meetings during the relevant period

·      Board Meeting Attendance Register

·      AFFIDAVIT CONFIRMING:

• The director had not attended meetings for 12 months

• Meeting notices were properly issued

• No litigation existed regarding the cessation

• The company was regular in MCA filings

COMPLIANCE WITH SECTIONS 167 AND 164

·      The ROC also gave the concerned director an opportunity to submit objections.

·      If no response was received, the DIR-12 was eventually approved.

CASE LAWS ON THE SUBJECT

Union of India v. R. Gandhi (Madras High Court, 2015)

The court emphasized that vacation of office under Section 167 is automatic and does not require a board resolution.

M.K. Srinivasan v. Registrar of Companies (NCLT, 2017)

The NCLT held that once a director fails to attend all meetings for 12 months, the company must file DIR12 with the ROC.

     The tribunal rejected arguments that leave of absence could protect the director, affirming that leave is irrelevant under Section 167(1)(b).


KEY LESSON LEARNED

Even though the law provides automatic vacation of office, the ROC may require strong documentary proof before approving DIR-12.

Proper corporate records are therefore critical.

YOUR COMPLIANCE PARTNER – R V SECKAR , FCS, LLB 79047 19295